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Good afternoon, and thank you, professor for inviting me to join you in 
Kalamazoo. I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss U.S. policy and 
engagement in the Horn of Africa. You have assembled an impressive and 
distinguished group of panelists for this important conference.  
 
THE CURRENT SITUATION  
 
As all of you know, the Horn of Africa is a rough neighborhood. At least one 
conflict – and frequently more – has raged in the region continuously since 
1960. Inter-state conventional wars. Guerrilla-style liberation struggles. Coups. 
Revolutions. The Horn has seen them all. It is also a region that has suffered 
historically from poor governance -- from the brutal excesses of Ethiopia’s 
Derg, to authoritarian one-party systems in much of the region until the 1990s, 
to the lawlessness of the failed state of Somalia after the fall of Siad Barre. 
Winner-take-all politics and violent regime change have been the norm. And 
this historically unstable political and security climate has been a profound 
impediment to economic development. 
 
The Horn ranks near the bottom in the world – and indeed below the rest of 
Africa - on Human Development indicators. The region is ecologically and 
economically fragile. Its peoples face the challenges of overwhelming 
dependence on rain-fed agriculture, as regular droughts trigger cyclical 
famines. Yet, despite these longstanding challenges, in most of the region we 
see signs of progress. Djibouti has held peaceful elections; its port has become 
an economic hub; and the government has become a partner in counterterrorism 
efforts. Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government offers the best hope for 
peace and stability in the last 20 years. Ethiopia has made progress on 
democratic governance with the release of political party detainees and 
parliamentary discussions on electoral and media reform.  
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Kenya, which has been spared the conflicts that have impeded the development 
of its neighbors, has become an economic powerhouse, has made tremendous 
strides to consolidate democracy, and plays a lead role in complex regional 
peace initiatives. Moreover, all of these countries and governments are 
increasingly close partners of the United States in the Horn of Africa.  
 
The glaring exception to this favorable story is of course Eritrea, which openly 
abuses its population and serves as a destabilizing force in the region. I’ll come 
to that later. While progress is fitful, and additional diplomatic and aid 
resources will be necessary to sustain success, the overall trajectory of the Horn 
is positive.  
 
In keeping with Secretary Rice’s concept of Transformational Diplomacy, 
United States government policy in the region focuses on partnership, while 
promoting regional stability and security, strengthening democratic processes 
and institutions, fostering economic growth, expanding the scope and quality of 
basic services, and responding to the humanitarian needs of vulnerable 
populations.  
 
The Horn is a region where Muslims and Christians coexist and intermingle, 
and where the cultures of ancient Ethiopia, of traditional Africa, and of the 
Arab-influenced coastal regions have combined in different ways to create 
unique national and regional identities. It is a region in which all of our 
Embassies and their officers are working to demonstrate our respect for 
different faith traditions and to promote our commitment to religious tolerance, 
political rights, and gender equality.  
 
While our Embassies are the U.S. Government’s principal platforms for 
promoting effective cooperation, governance reform and sustainable 
development, we also have a great asset in the Combined Joint Task Force – 
Horn of Africa in Djibouti. This U.S. military initiative provides a vehicle for 
outreach to vulnerable communities in the region and for contributing to the 
professionalization and effectiveness of armed forces in the Horn.  
 
So let me now discuss current developments and some of the key U.S. interests 
and policies in each of the countries of the Horn.  
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DJIBOUTI  
 
I’ll begin with Djibouti – which rarely gets top billing in a discussion of the 
Horn, but will today -- and then move clockwise through the region. Djibouti, 
which celebrated the 30th anniversary of its independence in June, in many 
ways epitomizes both the progress and the challenges we see on the Horn.  
 
With the end of the conflict with the Front for the Restoration of Unity and 
Democracy (FRUD) in the 1990s, and the return of the Front’s leader to 
Djibouti in 2000, Djibouti has moved beyond violent conflict. General elections 
in 1999 and 2003 were orderly and peaceful, despite a boycott by the major 
opposition coalition. Some opposition members are represented in local and 
regional councils. More needs to be done to open up political space and ensure 
that all citizens have a voice in government decisions. But the transition from 
armed combat to political competition is a positive step.  
 
On the economic front, Djibouti remains a poor country with per capita income 
below $1000. Yet it has a vision for development of its key assets – its port and 
strategic location along major sea-transport routes. Port tonnage – which tripled 
after the 1998 Eritrea-Ethiopia border war which cut access to Assab – has 
increase 30 percent per year between 2002 and 2004 under new management of 
Djibouti port. And Djibouti aspires to become an international hub for transit 
cargo serving not only the horn of Africa hinterland, but a much wider 
worldwide clientele.  
 
The United States, which has long had good relations with Djibouti, has seen 
this partnership further deepen in recent years. Since 2002, Djibouti has hosted 
the only permanent U.S. military base in sub-Saharan Africa, (CJFF-HOA)... 
We also value Djibouti’s diplomatic role in the region, as a bridge among other 
countries in the Horn and between African and Arab states.  
 
So in Djibouti, we see a country that has ended a protracted violent conflict, 
begun important steps toward greater political openness, developed a vision for 
its economic future, and engaged in a close partnership with the United States.  
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SOMALIA  
 
Now let me turn to Somalia – a country that, for all its problems, has perhaps 
the best opportunity in nearly two decades to overcome its status as a failed 
state. Somalia is a priority for the United States in Africa. U.S. policy is 
designed to promote stability in Somalia – including by preventing Somalia 
from again becoming a safehaven for terrorists, as it was under the Council of 
Islamic Courts – to support humanitarian and development needs, and to foster 
inclusive democratic institutions.  
 
The key to Somalia’s success will be national reconciliation to ensure inclusive 
representation in the Transitional Federal Institutions and in the organizations 
that will prepare the way for election of a permanent government in 2009, as 
called for by the Transitional Federal Charter.  
 
The National Reconciliation Congress, which opened in Mogadishu on July 15 
and is still ongoing, provides an opportunity for all Somalis to achieve suitable 
representation in the TFIs and formulate a roadmap for the remainder of the 
transitional period, in the run-up to national elections in 2009. In support of the 
National Reconciliation Congress, the United States has provided financial 
assistance of $1.25 million, in coordination with other international donors. Our 
Ambassador in Nairobi and our Special Envoy for Somalia are in frequent 
contact with congress organizer Ali Mahdi Mohamed, with Transitional Federal 
Government leaders, with clan elders, with civil society leaders, and a wide 
array of other stakeholders to encourage support for this process.  
 
We believe it is important for the Somali people to focus on the future, moving 
forward in the transitional political process as envisioned by the Charter, rather 
than focusing only on the current composition of the Transitional Federal 
Government and Institutions. While imperfect, the Transitional Federal 
Institutions provide a framework for achieving the objectives outlined in the 
Charter and the formation of representative governance institutions following 
the transitional process. We are steering clear from Somali politics and 
focusing on a clear message of inclusion and accommodation to all actors in 
Somalia.  
 
To help stabilize Somalia and create conditions for national reconciliation, the 
United States strongly supports the African Union’s peace support mission in 
Somalia. The mission currently has a lead contingent of approximately 1,600 
Ugandan troops deployed as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM).  
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At the beginning of the year, the United States identified $19.6 million to assist 
AMISOM forces. Approximately $10 million was used to provide equipment 
and airlift to assist the deployment of Uganda’s AMISOM contingent. 
Congress subsequently appropriated a further $40 million in funding to support 
AMISOM.  
 
AMISOM is important not only to help create conditions for national 
reconciliation, but also to permit the reduction in presence of Ethiopian forces 
and their eventual departure. We, the Somalis, and the Ethiopians themselves 
recognize that an Ethiopian military presence is not a long-term solution to 
insecurity in Somalia. For there to be lasting security, there must be political 
dialogue and accommodation among Somalis, improvements in Somali 
government capacity, and training and deployment of a competent and 
respected Somali security force.  
 
The United States is the largest bilateral donor of humanitarian assistance to 
Somalia, and has provided more than $102 million in humanitarian and 
development assistance this year. We also coordinate closely with other 
international partners diplomatically and on our international assistance 
programs. We were founding members of the International Contact Group on 
Somalia in June 2006, and also are active in the International Advisory 
Committee for the National Reconciliation Congress (NRC).  
 
In short, there is an international consensus that we must seize this moment of 
opportunity in Somalia. The United States is a leader on both the diplomatic 
front and in our humanitarian and economic response.  
 
KENYA  
 
Next let me say just a few words about Kenya, which is not always discussed as 
part of the Horn of Africa, but lies on its southern edge and is an important 
regional player. Nairobi hosts the largest U.S. diplomatic mission in Sub-
Saharan Africa, and we cooperate with the Kenyans on a wide array of both 
bilateral and regional programs. Our bilateral assistance program is more than 
$500 million in 2007. Total resource flows from the U.S. to Kenya each year 
from all public and private sources amount to about $1.5 billion.  
 
Kenya’s peaceful, credible democratic elections in 2002 represented an 
important step on Kenya’s path to becoming a fully functional democracy. The 
next elections, scheduled for December 2007 offer an opportunity to 
consolidate those gains.  
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The U.S. is providing election-related training to civil society organizations, 
political parties, and youth and women candidates, as well as supporting the 
work of the Electoral Commission of Kenya to ensure that these elections are 
free, fair, and transparent.  
 
Kenya is beginning to enjoy the fruits of its enviable regional reputation for 
stability, openness, and tolerance. Economic growth has increased to more than 
6 percent in recent years, as Kenya capitalizes on its role as a major regional 
hub. While important challenges remain – specifically in combating corruption, 
moving away from tribalism, and promoting gender equity – there is a palpable 
sense of energy and optimism among the Kenyan people. Kenya is clearly a 
country on the move in a positive direction.  
 
We have worked closely with the Kenyans diplomatically on the North-South 
peace agreement in Sudan and on Somalia issues, through the International 
Contact Group as well as bilaterally. In its capacity as President of the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Kenya continues to 
occupy a leadership role in promoting peace and stability in the Horn of Africa. 
We look forward to continued close partnership.  
 
ETHIOPIA  
 
Now, Ethiopia, which has been the subject of your conference. With more than 
70 million people, bordering all of the other Horn countries, Ethiopia is the 
giant of the region. Ethiopia is an important strategic partner for the United 
States in the Horn of Africa. We collaborate on a wide range of development 
objectives and in efforts to promote regional stability. We share a commitment 
to address threats by transnational extremist groups.  
 
We are also eager to see progress in democratic institutions. As you know, the 
run-up to the May 2005 national elections was the most open, free, and 
competitive political campaign period in all of Ethiopian history. Never before 
had opposition candidates had so much access to coveted constituencies and the 
ability to convene rallies and openly campaign against ruling party opponents.  
 
Opposition candidates’ access to the press, including state-owned and operated 
media, was unprecedented. Never before had the electorate seen live, televised 
debates between government Ministers and their opposition challengers.  
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Unfortunately, this spirit was lost in the contentious aftermath of the vote, in 
bloody confrontations in the streets, in detention of political leaders, and in 
strident and uncompromising positions that for too long dominated the political 
leadership. As we consider the democratic challenges facing Ethiopia today, we 
recognize that sentiment has been so bitter precisely because of the heightened 
expectations prompted by two decades of political reform.  
 
With the release of 38 detainees, and anticipated release of the remaining 
Coalition for Unity and Democracy leadership, and anticipated release of the 
remaining CUD leadership, following lengthy mediation by respected elders, 
Ethiopia’s political leaders have committed themselves to a new collaborative 
relationship for the good of the country. In Addis Ababa, U.S. foreign 
assistance programs are bringing together leaders from across the political 
spectrum to address critical questions of national governance and the future of 
the country, build the capacity of parliament, and bolster judicial independence.  
 
We are again seeing a cautious, yet engaged host of political parties that are 
committed to institutionalizing the advances of March and April 2005. That 
ruling and opposition parties today gather around the negotiating table to 
debate the relative merits of reforms of democratic institutions is extremely 
positive.  
 
We must all encourage this process. As stakeholders in Ethiopia's stability, 
democracy, and prosperity – we urge all parties to remain engaged, so that we 
can regain the advances of early 2005 and build upon them for the people of 
Ethiopia.  
 
Meanwhile, we continue a robust program of U.S. humanitarian and 
development assistance for Ethiopia. We have contributed more than $160 
million in humanitarian assistance this year to help the Ethiopian people break 
the cycle of famine and mitigate the impact of drought and natural disasters. 
With over $300 million in assistance to the health care system in Ethiopia this 
year alone, we help ensure that clinics reach into previously underserved 
regions including Afar and the Ogaden.  
 
With respect to the Ogaden, we are concerned that insecurity and impediments 
to commercial sales of commodities put the population of this fragile region at 
further risk. We are currently working with the government to ensure that 
humanitarian assistance and the more important commercial shipments can 
flow to the Ogaden. We note that rains have been relatively good this year, 
which should ease the economic hardship faced by the pastoralist population.  
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In conflict-prone areas, U.S. programs bring together representatives from 
diverse communities during periods of calm, in order to build bridges of 
understanding and prevent potential conflicts from erupting. We are working 
with local administrations to build their capacity to govern for the people and to 
promote transparency. We are working with the Ethiopian military to transform 
that organization into a professional and apolitical defense force for the nation. 
The challenges are many, but the objectives merit the tremendous scope of the 
resources, time, and commitment that we have focused on them. We are 
confident that through partnership with local stakeholders, together we will 
contribute to making Ethiopia more secure, more democratic, and more 
prosperous for the next generation.  
 
A STEP BACKWARD: ERITREA  
 
Now, let me turn to Eritrea. While the rest of the Horn of Africa is making 
political, economic, and social advances and seizing opportunities -- albeit with 
periodic important setbacks -- the opposite is true for Eritrea.  
 
Eritrea has experienced economic decline and a lack of freedoms, for the press 
and political expression. There is widespread and arbitrary conscription. The 
government has worked to destabilize its neighbors, including Ethiopia and 
Somalia.  
 
Given the American penchant for supporting the underdog, it is disheartening 
to see what has become of Eritrea in the 14 years since it gained independence 
and produced a praiseworthy constitution. President Isaias Afwerki has become 
increasingly tyrannical and megalomaniacal. He has actively sought to 
destabilize the Horn, fueling regional insurgencies and supporting groups 
affiliated with terrorists.  
 
Eritrean Government policies have also choked the Eritrean economy and 
consolidated political power among a small cadre of cronies, who are 
distinguished only by their unwavering loyalty to the President. 
The government has actively blocked humanitarian assistance from 
international donors. It initiated the border war with Ethiopia that cost tens of 
thousands of lives.  
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The Eritrean Government has fabricated a national mythology by demonizing 
neighboring Ethiopia, for the central purpose of garnering complete compliance 
with his autocratic domestic policies. By channeling Eritreans' patriotism into 
hostility toward Ethiopia, the government ensures that [it] can rule as it likes, 
without public opposition. Democracy and economic opportunity remain purely 
theoretical concepts for the people of Eritrea.  
 
As you know, the reality is atrocious. Youth are sent to camps for 
indoctrination. Citizens in the prime of their lives are forced into national 
service; anyone who refuses is beaten. If you flee, your family is imprisoned. 
Those who fail to espouse officially sanctioned opinions languish in metal 
shipping containers.  
 
As in the former Soviet Union, the Eritrean government controls both the 
message and the medium. There are no opposition political parties, no non-
governmental organizations, no private media. Any senior government official 
who dares to speak out puts himself at risk. The brave individuals known as the 
G-15, who challenged Eritrea's path back in the spring of 2001, are missing.  
 
Elsewhere in the region, Eritrea has chosen to support extremist elements, 
including the al-Qaida affiliated al Shabaab militia in Somalia, in an effort to 
undermine the political process. While the rest of the region and the 
international community have united behind a common strategy for achieving 
lasting peace and stability in Somalia, Eritrea has opted to support terrorists and 
spoilers while encouraging continued violence. There is no justification for 
such actions. The ruling cabal is – to our great regret -- leading Eritrea along 
the path toward increased domestic repression and hardship, and regional and 
international isolation.  
 
BOUNDARY DISPUTE  
 
Since the border dispute with Ethiopia serves as the pretext for Eritrea’s 
domestic authoritarianism, let me say a final few words about how the U.S. 
sees this issue. This impasse has been a long-festering flashpoint between 
Eritrea and Ethiopia, and it is of course symptomatic of deeper divisions 
between the two countries. The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission 
(EEBC) issued its delimitation decision in 2002. Yet, the two parties have still 
not cooperated on demarcation of the boundary. Both appear comfortable with 
the status quo. Ethiopia avoids painful domestic political decisions, while 
Eritrea uses the unresolved issue to goad Ethiopia and deflect attention from a 
deteriorating domestic situation.  
 10 
 
The United States government fully supports the “final and binding” decisions 
of the EEBC and has consistently called on both parties to cooperate with the 
EEBC and meet their commitments in the Algiers Agreements. We work 
closely with the other Witnesses to the Algiers Agreements -- including 
Algeria, the African Union, the European Union, and the United Nations -- and 
other interested governments.  
 
The level of urgency has increased, as the situation has recently deteriorated. 
Both parties remain wedded to their positions and may have hardened them. 
Eritrea has moved about 4,000 troops along with supporting artillery and armor 
into the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ), a buffer zone between the parties, and 
restricted the activities of UNMEE, a UN peacekeeping force. Eritrea maintains 
a further 120,000 troops in the vicinity, while Ethiopia has deployed about 
100,000 troops along the border.  
 
We believe it is essential for the parties to discuss directly how to implement a 
workable boundary regime, consistent with the decisions of the EEBC, and to 
address the fundamental issues that divide them. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-
moon has offered to engage the parties, and we support his initiative. The 
Ethiopian Government has agreed to participate in this initiative, and we urge 
the Eritrean government to do so as well. We will continue our efforts and 
support those of others to resolve this issue and remove one flash point in an 
already unstable region and bring the parties closer to a normalized 
relationship.  
 
So, in conclusion, this is a tough neighborhood, economically fragile, with a 
history of violent conflict and of uncompromising politics. Huge challenges 
remain. Yet, overall, there is reason to be hopeful about the Horn. Progress may 
not be uniform, but with the exception of Eritrea, we are working in partnership 
with local governments toward a more peaceful and prosperous Horn of Africa.  
 
Thank you again for inviting me to join you today, and I look forward to 
answering any questions that you may have. 
 
 
 
